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organization would not result in unfair benefit in

competition regarding the sale private label brand
products. Further, the court stated that competition
between Topco members and national supermarket
chains would be substantially reduced by the elimination
of Topco's practices. Thus, the court concluded that the
relief which the Government sought would not increase
competition in Topco private label brands, but would

substantially diminish competition in the supermarket
field. Since the court found that the antitrust laws were
not intended to accomplish such a result and that the
consuming public would be disadvantaged if the
Government prevailed, the district court entered
judgment for Topco and held that the practices did not
constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act.

Horizontal restraints on competition are violations
per se of the Sherman Act
by Tom O'Connor
In United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596
(1972), the Supreme Court held that
a cooperative purchasing association
for independent supermarket chains
violated the Sherman Act by
restricting intraassociation competition. Despite a lack of price-fixing
on the part of the cooperative
purchasing association, the Court
further held that the association's
practices violated the Sherman Act
because the association restricted
competition by limiting the area in
which members could sell certain
goods.
The federal Government ("Government") brought an action for
injunctive relief against Topco
Associates, Inc. ("Topco") for
granting exclusive marketing
territories to the association's
members. The Government argued
that Topco engaged in a horizontal
restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. Topco contended that
its marketing restrictions were
necessary for the association to stay
in business and that these restrictions actually increased competition
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in the supermarket field by allowing
the members of the association to
compete with the larger, rival
supermarket chains. The Court
rejected Topco's arguments and
ruled in favor of the Government.

Topco created to help

small supermarket chains
compete with large chains
Topco was a cooperative association of approximately 25 independently operated small- and mediumsized supermarket chains, created in
the 1940s in order to obtain high
quality merchandise under a private
label. The manufacturer of a private
label permits only a limited number
of stores to sell its goods. A private
label allows retailers of the specified
goods to take advantage of the
economies of scale in all levels of
production while maintaining the
same standard of quality as other
name brands. A private label
arrangement facilitates the sale of
private label goods at a lower price
than other brand name items and
competition with large, national

chains. By 1964, Topco's members
had combined retail sales of $2.3
billion, less than only three national
chains.

Topco members operated
under geographic
limitations
Each of the members of the
Topco association operated in a
specific geographic territory. Topco
defined the boundaries of each
member's territory and required the
receipt of special permission for a
member to sell private label goods
in another district. Topco also
required its members to obtain
special permission to sell goods
wholesale. According to Topco's bylaws, each member possessed one of
three types of licensed territories: (1)
an exclusive territory, in which the
licensed member was the only
member allowed to sell the private
label; (2) a nonexclusive territory, in
which the licensed member might
have to share the territory with
another member, or (3) a coextensive territory, in which two or more
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members were licensed to sell
within the same territory. When a
potential member applied for
admission to the association, Topco
required the applicant to apply for
one of these three specific licenses.
The association members voted to
approve or deny all new applications. Members already licensed to
do business within 100 miles of the
applicant's prospective territory
could essentially veto an application.
After joining the association,
Topco required each member to sign
a contract not to sell Topco-brand
products outside of its designated
territory. Most of the territories were
exclusive and most of the coextensive or nonexclusive territories were,
in practice, also exclusive.
The Government argued that
Topco's division of markets violated
the federal antitrust laws by prohibiting competition with Topco-brand
products. The Government also
submitted a subsidiary challenge to
the association's policy of prohibiting members from selling their
products wholesale. The Government maintained that this policy
constituted a territorial restriction
and a restriction on customers, both
violating the Sherman Act.

Topco contended
restrictions on
intraassociation
competition led to greater
overall competition
In answering the complaint,
Topco accepted most of the facts
stated by the Government as true.
However, Topco maintained that the
facts did not suggest that the
association restricted competition.
Rather, Topco contended that the
facts supported an increase in
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competition. Topco argued that the
system of allocating exclusive
marketing rights by territory
encouraged competition in the
supermarket field as a whole by
allowing the smaller firms in the
association to compete with the
mammoth, rival supermarket chains.
Topco further asserted that its
members would not be able to
realize a sufficient profit margin on
Topco-brand goods to maintain
operations without the exclusivity
arrangements. Topco argued that the
elimination of the association would
lead to further dominance by the big
chains and the demise of the smaller
chains. Topco argued that this chain
of events would decrease competition to the detriment of the consumer.

Supreme Court establishes
rule of reason doctrine
The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois
entered judgment for Topco. Despite
the reduction in competition
between retailers of Topco-brand
products, the increase in competition
in the supermarket market as a
whole proved more important to the
district court. The district court
noted Topco's practices to be
procompetitive. However, the
Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed and remanded the case.
The Supreme Court based its
decision, in part, on Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The Sherman Act, in
relevant part reads, "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of
a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I

(1995). The Court explained that
this section appears to theoretically
bar any and every commercial
contract. However, the Court relied
on the (legislative) history of the
antitrust laws-which demonstrates
that Congress did not intend to bar
every contract. In fact, the legislature intended to allow the courts to
consider the circumstances surrounding a contract before determining whether a violation of the
antitrust laws exists. The circumstances a court should consider
include the nature of the business in
question, the nature of the restricting
contract, and the history of the
reason for the restraint. The Court
labeled this analysis the 'rule of
reason' doctrine. Under the rule of
reason doctrine, a court ruling on
possible antitrust violations can
consider, among other circumstances, the intention of the parties
involved in the contract.
In applying the rule of reason
doctrine on remand, the district
court ruled that Topco did not
commit a violation of the Sherman
Act because the exclusivity arrangement promoted competition more
than the arrangement restricted it.

Violations per se can be
determined without 'rule
of reason'
The Supreme Court also discussed 'violations per se' of the
Sherman Act and indicated that the
violations should be considered
before applying the 'rule of reason'
doctrine. Violations per se result
from contracts which are so obviously detrimental to free trade that a
court should bar them without
regard to their reasonableness. The
Court labeled a horizontal restraint
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as one example of a violation per se.
A horizontal restraint is a contract
between competitors in the same
industry and at the same level in the
production pyramid which reduces
competition. The Court stated that
Topco's exclusivity contracts, which
imposed territorial restrictions, were
horizontal restraints and, thus,
violations per se. Therefore, the
Court determined the rule of reason
doctrine to be inapplicable in this
case.
Drawing a comparison to a
previous Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967), the Court found that the
situations were factually and
functionally similar. In Sealy, the
defendants, licensed manufacturers
of bedding materials, sold Sealy
products. Sealy was a corporation
owned by its licensees. Sealy
maintained an exclusivity arrangement with its licensees similar to
Topco's arrangement. In Sealy, the
Court held that the defendant was
guilty of horizontal restraints-a
violation per se of the Sherman Act.
The Court defended the rigidity
of the per se rule as necessary to
guide business people and the
courts. The Court reasoned that
business people would be unable to
discern whether Topco's practices
are legal or illegal without direction
of which actions constitute violations of the antitrust laws.
The Court further indicated that
the courts need a sign-post to avoid
weighing, among other issues, the
relative importance of different
levels of restriction in different
sectors of the economy because so
many subtle economic considerations exist in every case. According
to the Court, these rules should be
applied notwithstanding any
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possible defenses, i.e., particular
economic circumstances or market
strategies. In this case, horizontal
restriction of competition violates
Section 2 and, thus, is illegal despite
rules of reason components to the
contrary.
The Court rejected Topco's
argument that the association
increased competition in the
aggregate. The Court reasoned that
Topco possessed no authority to
compare the relative worth of one
sector of the economy to another,
especially given its prominent role
within certain sectors of the supermarket market. Comparing the
antitrust laws to the Magna Carta,
the Court stated that the freedom to
compete could not be foreclosed in
one sector in favor of promoting
competition in another sector. The
Court noted that Congress could
make an exception to the antitrust
laws but that neither the Court nor
private economic entities possess the
right to make that change.
Finally, the Court concluded that
the reasoning which it applied to the
territorial restrictions applied
equally as well to the restriction that
Topco's members could not sell at
wholesale. The Court reasoned that
the restriction on the right of
Topco's members to sell goods at
wholesale essentially regulated
Topco's customers. Thus, the Court
held that the restriction constituted a
violation per se of the Sherman Act.

Justice Blackmun

concurred
Justice Blackmun wrote a
concurring opinion to express his
concern that the majority's decision,
while technically sound, would
ironically reduce competition as

predicted by the defendants. He was
also reluctant to argue against the
application of the per se rule
because the rule had been "firmly
established." Justice Blackmun
closed by agreeing with Justice
Marshall and declaring that "[rielief,
if any is to be forthcoming, apparently must be by way of legislation."

Chief Justice Burger
dissented
Chief Justice Burger dissented,
arguing that Topco did not commit a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Burger implicitly argued that the
'rule of reason' doctrine should be
the threshold inquiry rather than
whether an arrangement is a
'violation per se.' He attacked the
applicability of the cases the
majority looked to in supporting the
principal holding. In particular, the
Chief Justice attacked United States
v. Sealy as failing to conclude that
horizontal limitations by themselves
qualify as per se violations.
The Chief Justice concluded by
stating that the majority, in effect,
created a new per se violation
standard. The Chief Justice quoted
Senator Sherman's 1890 address to
Congress in support of what would
become the Sherman Act. Senator
Sherman described his goal in
creating the bill as one which would
attempt:
. .. only to prevent and control
combinations made with a
view to prevent competition,
or for the restraint of trade, or
to increase the profits of the
producer at the cost of the
consumer. It is the unlawful
combination, tested by the
rules of common law and
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human experience, that is
aimed at by this bill, and not
the lawful and useful combination ....
Chief Justice Burger argued
Senator Sherman's this address

indicated that the legislature
intended the 'rule of reason' doctrine
to apply to each case, especially
when an argument can be made that
the arrangement under question
promoted competition.
In conclusion, despite Chief

Justice Burger's dissent, the Court
ruled in favor of the Government in
holding that any horizontal restraint
of competition constitutes a violation
per se of the Sherman Act, regardless
of the intended effect on overall
competition.

Supreme Court ruling of Sherman Act violations
given limited application on remand
by Erin Quinlan
On remand from the Supreme Court, Judge Will
modified his original opinion in U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1976), to conform to the
Supreme Court's holding, but in a way which preserved
the substance of his original decision. U.S. v. Topco
Associates, Inc., No. 68 C 76,1972 WL 669 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 26, 1972).
Judge Will limited the Supreme Court's finding of a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act to those Topco
arrangements which promoted exclusivity. Judge Will
concluded that the Court only addressed Topco's
arrangements which prevented other members and
nonmember small chains from selling Topco brand
products in certain regional territories. Judge Will found
that the Supreme Court held this containment to be
noncompetitive behavior.
Conversely, Judge Will viewed these arrangements as
a way for small and local chains to compete with the
national chains. According to Judge Will, limiting the
sale of the generic Topco brands allowed the local stores
and smaller chains to compete with the national chains,
thus, producing economic efficiencies. Judge Will
concluded that eliminating Topco's arrangement would
hurt consumers by forcing them to purchase only
national store brand products.
In his final judgment, Judge Will followed the
Supreme Court's holding, but wanted to ensure that his
1997

ruling would not completely eliminate what he believed
to be economically efficient arrangements. Furthermore,
Judge Will felt that the arrangements were beneficial in
promoting competition between the national and local
and smaller chains, so long as they were not misused.
Therefore, Judge Will included a paragraph in the
opinion permitting exclusive arrangements in certain
instances.
To ensure that these arrangements could still exist but
not be misused, Judge Will implemented regulatory
procedures in his final judgment. These regulations
required Topco to file a report with the government
every year for ten years setting forth the steps it undertook during the prior year in advising its officers,
directors and employees of their obligations under this
judgment.
In addition, the final judgment granted the Department of Justice, upon written request from the Attorney
General, access to Topco's files, records, and ledgers,
relating to any matters addressed in the final judgment.
The Department was also given the right to interview
any of Topco's officers and employees regarding such
matters. The final judgment further stated that the
Department must give Topco reasonable notice if it
intends to exercise these procedures.
These regulatory guidelines threaten to infringe upon
Topco's right to privacy and confidentiality. The final
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